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A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy
Insofar as »comparative philosophy« is a branch of philosophy reason
must be instrumental in its pursuit, given that philosophy is the em-
ployment of the human capacity for reasoned thought to »understand
how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in
the broadest possible sense of the term.« But comparative philosophy
is not, I submit, a branch of philosophy nor it is a distinct philosophi-
cal method: it is an expedient heuristic introduced at a particular mo-
ment in world history as part of a global movement towards intellec-
tual decolonisation. The ambition of comparative philosophy was not
to generate new philosophical insights but to protect thinkers in colo-
nised countries from the peculiar form of intellectual servitude colo-
nialism sought to impose. Recognition and integration were its lead-
ing motifs: a first generation of philosophers, still colonised, seeking
recognition for indigenous manners of understanding through the
demonstration of their comparability with colonial insight; a second
generation, in the years after the end of colonial rule, hoping for
assimilation and integration in an internationalised philosophical
academy. Philosophers writing bravely against the grain in colonised
societies or in the ferment of postcolonial nation state formation
made extraordinary progress in the rediscovery of lost philosophical
inheritances and in the demonstration of their full entitlement to
philosophical recognition. Yet coloniser philosophy remained in such
endeavours a privileged mode of thought and point of reference, if
only as a focus of resistance. These projects aimed either to incorpo-
rate indigenous thinking into an unchallenged colonial paradigm or
else to reverse colonial asymmetries while leaving a fundamentally
colonial structure intact.
By ›colonial‹ I mean European in the context of South America,
Africa and much of South-east Asia; British in the context of India
and the rest of South Asia, the Gulf, North America, Australasia, and
southern Africa; Soviet in the context of Central Asia, the Baltic and
134
the Caucasus; Han in the context of Tibet, Mongolia, and inside
mainland China; American in the context of the Pacific basin; Danish
in the context of Nordic countries; Japanese in the context of Korea,
Taiwan and China. When in what follows I refer to »the colonial use
of reason« I shall not mean its use by the ancients or pre-moderns but
by those philosophical giants in the 18th and 19th centuries who pro-
vided colonialism with its moral and intellectual foundations. This
colonial use of reason represented itself as impartial, objective and
universal but was in fact anything but, and that was its first dishon-
esty. Its second was the way it defended its claims to impartiality and
universality over and against competing claims from outside. It did
not engage in honest debate, philosopher to philosopher, but instead
dismissed the alternative’s claim to universality altogether. So coloni-
sers took what was in fact itself a local way of using reason (one con-
textually entangled with the history of the colonial project), falsely
promoted it as a uniquely acontextual methodology, and denied that
outsiders had so much as a concept of the general application of rea-
son on the grounds that they did not share its parochial epistemic
practices.
Colonial rationalists’ false claim to neutrality catches the ex-
cluded outsider in a vicious dilemma: make your use of reason like
ours (in which case what extra value does your philosophy bring to
the table?), or admit that you are outside reason and not actually
engaged in philosophy at all. The dilemma is false because the neu-
trality of colonial reason it presupposes is a phoney mixture of two
myths. The first, that the colonial will to universality is impartial; the
second that the existence of the outsider’s will to universality is to be
denied. In denying outsiders a will to universality, the coloniser de-
nied them their humanity, and the various ignominious philosophical
rationalisations of colonial rule were but corollaries of this basic dou-
ble move. Simone Weil would observe it in the intrinsic absurdity of
children in French Polynesia being made to recite »Our ancestors the
Gauls had blond hair and blue eyes […]« while forbidden their indi-
genous custom, language and tradition, forbidden even access to the
libraries containing documentation relating to it; and was it not Ma-
caulay who said that a random single shelf of European books was of
more value to humanity than the entirety of Sanskrit literature. The
move is evident when a history of epistemology in the west describes
itself simply as the history of epistemology, protest met with disin-
terest. The colonial power had philosophy, the rest of the world has
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only what was described as »culture« or, more condescendingly still,
»wisdom tradition«. The colonisers’ claim that reason (meaning their
specific and provincial use of reason) is a neutral tool had thus to be
exposed as trickery, this a precondition for the intellectual decolonisa-
tion of the rest of the world, and the redressing of a blatant epistemic
injustice was the ambition and project of comparative philosophy.
The world of academic philosophy is now entering a new age,
one defined neither by colonial need for recognition nor by postcolo-
nial wish to integrate. The indicators of this new era include heigh-
tened appreciation of the value of world philosophies, the internatio-
nalisation of the student body, the philosophical pluralism which
interaction and migration in new global movements make salient,
growing concerns about diversity within a still too-white faculty
body and curricular canon, and identification of a range of deep struc-
tural problems with the contemporary philosophical academy in its
discursive, citational, refereeing and ranking practices. We are enter-
ing what we might call »the age of re:emergence«, a new period the
key features of which are as follows. First, philosophies from every
region of the world, locally grounded in lived experience and reflec-
tion upon it, are finding new autonomous and authentic forms of
articulation. Second, philosophical industry, leaving behind a centre-
periphery mode of production, is becoming again polycentric: the phi-
losophical world is returning to a plural and diverse network of pro-
ductive sites. Third, Europe and other colonial powers have been pro-
vincialised, no longer mandatory conversation partners or points of
comparison but rather unprivileged participants in global dialogue.
Fourth, philosophers within the largely anglophone international
academy are beginning to acknowledge their responsibility so to ar-
range international institutions as to enable wide and open participa-
tion; that is, acknowledge that their control over the academy is a fall-
out from colonialism rather than a reflection of intellectual superior-
ity.
Philosophers in the age of re:emergence certainly are thinkers
using reason to seek new ways to understand how things, including
human beings, hang together. However, the uses they make of reason
are markedly different from the way reason has been used and abused
in colonial intellectual projects in Europe and elsewhere. Conscious
by necessity of the colonisers’ ways of doing philosophy, newly emer-
gent thinkers are continuously on guard not to allow themselves to
fall into the invidious dilemma described above. A re:emergent way of
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thinking must combine appeal to the indigenous with defensive dia-
lectical skills. Non-Europeans had to turn themselves into Europea-
nists in order to figure out how to side-step its enslavements; the
same was true of those who were at the mercy of other colonial
powers. Philosophy in the age of re:emergence is thus not a matter
of seeking the essence of autochthonous ways of thinking, and indeed
essentialism about philosophical traditions is but a modern strategy
to cope with colonial guilt, resting in the vain hope that the colonised
have not, after all, been deprived of intellectual integrity. The once-
colonised. do not have the luxury to practice philosophy in some state
of philosophical innocence, and nor do they wish for it: for in this new
era every philosophical identity is hybrid and dynamic, criss-crossing
multiple localities of geography and epoch, transcending each and
again returning (»cross-cultural philosophy« and »fusion philoso-
phy« are but special cases of the re:emergent project, as is »intercul-
tural translation«, but re:emergence does not require cross-cultural-
ity). They leave to philologists and text-critical historians the attempt
to construct an archaeology of past systems of thought destined only
to become specimens in a museum of ideas, for the once-colonised has
always to watch against being made into an ethnographic object. For
them the use of reason consists in the manner in which they inherit a
past and transform it into an articulation of a lived experience, and in
that very act of retrieval and reinvention fashion a distinctive under-
standing of how it all hangs together, and why. When it is therefore
asked, »Can Asians and other non-Europeans think and reason?«, the
answer is »Yes, of course!«. Must they think and reason as if they are
Europeans? No, because the fundamental asymmetry that colonial-
ism produced cannot simply be made to disappear in an act of collec-
tive amnesia of the sort intellectuals of former colonial powers seem
so remarkably adept. The cosmopolitanisms of re:emergence are sub-
altern and subversive interplays between a plurality of open vernacu-
lars and new, non-coercive, ways to think about our common human-
ity. Solidarity across borders among the once-colonised leads to
revitalisations in the understanding of those various inherited pasts,
revitalisations that in turn deepen cosmopolitan awareness (such a
project indeed retrieves the cosmopolitan ideal from imperial misap-
propriation).
As philosophers in every linguistic and geographical region of
the globe re:emerge, so too do innovative ways to use reason. I shall
give two examples of ways of using reason that do not fall into the
137
A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy
colonial model I have criticised. Here I appeal to India, the non-Eur-
opean philosophical world I know best: world philosophers every-
where must retrieve from their own inheritances their own renewed
ways to use reason. My studies of logical theory in India have led me
to see that there is a fundamental contrast between two styles of rea-
soning, that of formal deduction and that of particularist, case-based,
»blueprint+adaptation« extrapolation. The latter model – whose ori-
gins in India lie as much in the ritual reasoning of the Mīmāṃsā
exegetes and the jurisprudence of the Dharmaśāstra as in explorations
in the science of prediction in the medical treatises and, perhaps most
especially, in early Nyāya logic – developed into a general theory of
ethical and normative reasoning. The basic idea is that an object is
inferred to have one, unobserved, property on the grounds that it
has another, observed, one: »there is fire on the mountain because
there is smoke there«. The most distinctive aspect of the schema is
the fundamental importance given to the citation of an example, a
single case said either to be similar or else dissimilar to the topic at
hand. Suppose I want to persuade you that it is about to rain. I might
reason as follows: »Look, it is going to rain (pakṣa: proposed thesis).
For see that large black cloud (hetu: sign). Last time you saw a large
black cloud like that one (dṛṣṭānta: exemplary case), what happened?
Well, it’s the same now (upanaya: application). It is definitely going
to rain (nigamana: decision)«. What does it tell us about the nature of
reason when particulars are in this way made to work as exemplary
cases? First, that methods of selection and adaptation are implied by
the description of the particular. As a structured complex whole, the
particular is normative: it constrains what other particulars count as
resembling it by sharing a common basic framework, and it con-
strains what modifications or substitutions are possible, thereby de-
termining a method of adaptation. Like a curved object used as a
benchmark, an exemplary case bends the ruler to fit itself. Second,
the standards are context-sensitive and localised, because of the re-
quirement that proper purpose is preserved, whether that be match-
ing the shapes of objects, performing rituals that have their intended
effects, or making accurate predictions. This implies that substitutions
and comparisons remain close to the prototype, that the spread of the
standards of selection and adaptation is localised. In both versions of
the »blueprint+adaptation« model, the version in which particulars
are typical samples and the version in which they are prototypical
schemata, the standard is not absolute and universal, but localised,
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sensitive to context and open-textured. The early Indian thinkers
thus present an important style of thinking well, yet one that is not
understood if we think of all good reasoning as involving subsump-
tion to general rule.
Within this model there can be diversity in reasoning-and-eval-
uating practice without incommensurability. From variation in rea-
soning practice it does not follow that the idea of reason itself is con-
text-sensitive, though the uses to which it is put may well be: it
implies only that there is a variation in the base-sets of exemplars
and in the kinds of background information that inform similarity
judgements. Case-based norms are trans-sectarian but dialogue-spe-
cific. The model provides for the kind of immersed rational practice
that I regard as essential in the evaluation, development and criticism
of values, using cognitive resources available to a group in order to
provide authentic forms of justification (for example, of human
rights) and critical revision (for example, of social inequality); that
is, a method for the evaluation of values that is both genuinely critical
and yet does not imperiously impose from without. The Sanskrit idea
of the pūrvapakṣa (an opponent imaginatively considered by the
author of a philosophical work) is that of potential objection that is
in this sense immersed.
The act of bringing into contact philosophical ideas from distinct
geographical regions or linguistic communities should be seen as
being itself a creative one, the act of creating a »case«, a site of unre-
solved tension between conflicting measures, and the working out of
the case is itself constitutive of a form of philosophical practice, produ-
cing in time newmeasures, new philosophies, newmodels for the way
individuals conceive of themselves and their place in the world. It is an
illustration of the way in which forms of philosophical practice can be
governed by reason even in the absence of some explicitly identified
common ground (a common ground is implied but not explicit). Such
acts of creative philosophical confrontation are by their very nature
embedded in the moment, and the rules by which they are governed
must themselves be adjusted to every new encounter. The philosopher
identifies cases of interesting contraposition and, in the spirit of the
theory just set out, exploits those moments of resemblance in pro-
cesses of adaptation and substitution to fashion new strategies in phi-
losophical inquiry. This is an intellectual activity that replaces com-
parative philosophy in the age of re:emergence, and it is indeed a
genuinely philosophical use of reason in search of understanding.
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There is, to give a second example of an acolonial use of reason, a
kind of philosophy that consists in perspicuous ordering, staying on
the surface, rendering evident. The distinction between, on the one
hand, generative explanations, the step-by-step reasoning of a philo-
sophical deduction, and, on the other, using insightful ordering and
sparseness to put the phenomenon in question on display, has a
strong parallel in the Indian mathematicians’ discussion of a kind of
mathematical proof, which they say aims at rendering a mathematical
result transparent rather than reaching it in a series of deductive
steps. So Bhāskara II’s diagrammatic proof of the theorem known
from the Sulba-sūtra is meant to display the theorem not deduce it.
A diagram is just a diagram, it does not itself do anything: what does
the proving is the viewer’s moving triangles around in imagination to
form two squares. So, likewise, philosophy here occurs at the inter-
face between text and reader, in the reader’s acquisition of a clear
perspective in the topology of concepts through their imaginative en-
gagement with the text. One finds this method at work in the Indian
philosophers who compose extremely compact texts, written in short
aphorism-like formula which aim more at conceptual cartography
than at system-building. Seeing interrelatedness is as creative a phi-
losophical act as drawing consequences. One is a matter of evidence,
the other of what is evident. The interrelations between the compo-
nents of a complex theoretical structure can be explained or at least
explicated by displaying their isomorphism with another structure,
perhaps more familiar or antecedently better understood; so, in this
method, similes function as models. A clear map of the conceptual
terrain is a powerful tool, enabling both creative thought and empa-
thetic attention, and philosophy based on this second use of reason
has not lost sight of its ties to deepened ways of living. In this use of
reason, the idea of omission plays an important role, for philosophers
who use reason in this second way are careful to omit anything that
can cloud the reader’s capacity to form a picture – a large part of
philosophical skill is knowing what to ignore.
Thus I would say that what makes a practice philosophical is the
use of distinctively human capacities to find orientation in the space
of reasons (that is to say, to move from perplexity or saṃśaya to
clarity or nirṇaya), and that orientation can come either in the form
of a reasons compass, which enables the activity of going step-by-step
engaging one’s powers of deductive manoeuvring and capacities for
projective extrapolation, or else in the form of a concept map, which
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engages the imagination and enables one to make a survey of the
terrain, locating oneself within it. This conception of philosophy em-
bodies a type of pluralistic realism, a commitment to the claim that
there are many ways to investigate a reality whose existence is inde-
pendent of human inquirers, a plurality of ways of thinking that can-
not be reduced to any single mode of interrogation (least of all to the
colonial use of reason).
I have described two techniques for the interrogation of reality
that I discovered through commerce with Indian philosophical texts
in Sanskrit, and I have given an indication of the styles of philosophi-
cal practice they sustain and their potential for contributing to a re:
emergence of creative philosophy from this one part of the decolo-
nised world. Those who are immersed in philosophies from Africa,
Asia, Mesoamerica and Australasia will have their own contributions
to make, and we may look to a future when there will be a vibrant
pluralistic realism in departments of academic philosophy around the
globe, and a new cartography of philosophy.1
–Jonardon Ganeri, New York University
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1 Acknowledgements: I have drawn the term »re:emergence« and its distinctive
typography from Yuko Hasegawa, curator of the exhibition »Re:emerge: Towards a
New Cultural Geography« hhttp://www.sharjahart.org/biennial/sharjah-biennial-11/
informationi; the colon suggesting correlative obligations of submerger and sub-
merged. The famous first definition of philosophy is due to Wilfred Sellars. I have
learned from Hamid Dabashi, »Can Non-Europeans Think?« hhttp://www.aljazeera.
com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/2013114142638797542.htmli, Bharat Vallabha, »The
Philosophy of Pluralism« hhttp://insearchofanideal.com/2015/07/05/the-philoso
phy-of-pluralism/#more-1016i, Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, »Comparative Philoso-
phy as a Philosophy of Practice«, Mimesis World Philosophies Workshop, SOAS June
2015, and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South (2014). The epis-
temology of visual thinking in mathematics, to which I allude, is excellently analysed
by Marcus Giaquinto hhttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/epistemol
ogy-visual-thinking/i.
Reflections on Re:emergent Philosophy
1 Philosophy without Borders and
Cosmopolitan Thought Zones
Re:emergent philosophy consists in a retrieval and rearticulation of
precolonial philosophical heritages in such a manner as to enable
creative philosophical thinking in solidarity with others. Let me begin
by describing two ideas in the same conceptual territory. Early in
2016 a new volume appeared. Edited by Arindam Chakrabarti and
Ralph Weber, its official title is Comparative Philosophy without
Borders (2016). Yet this title is a little misleading, for the essays
contained in it are not exercises in comparative philosophy but ex-
plorations in a beyond-comparative experiment the editors term
»borderless philosophy«, ones for which their »Introduction« and
»Afterword« constitute a brilliant call-to-arms: »Once we have
climbed up to the level playing field of global combative cooperative
critical creative philosophy from the fetid wells of centuries of unac-
knowledged epistemic inequalities, we can, it is hoped, throw away
the ladder of comparison« (ibid.: 238). A borderless philosophy
should »spontaneously straddle geographical areas and cultures, tem-
peraments and time-periods« (ibid.: 22) in which »instead of preser-
ving, quoting, and juxtaposing [one’s sources], one picks up a concept,
a line of reasoning or some, however minor point arising out of years
of imaginative rearrangement and cross-fertilization of the ideas re-
trieved from different cultures, periods, texts, and disciplines« (ibid.:
231). Borderless philosophy is not a synthetic »fusion«, because in a
borderless philosophy, »when making, say Zhuangzi speak to Straw-
son about knowing other minds, the point cannot be which of them is
right to say what he says, but simply what is the right thing to say,
independently of who says it. What would come out would perhaps
be less historical and less encyclopaedic as a reference to this philoso-
pher or that philosopher, but it would be something valuable, some-
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thing in a twilight zone, surely something constructive, probably
even something original« (ibid.: 232). A borderless philosophy leaves
behind three stages of comparativism, a first stage in which analogues
for Western ideas were sought in non-Western traditions, a second
stage which discovered lacunae in Western tradition in comparison
with the non-Western, and a third stage defined by the imperative
»to re-interpret Indian, Chinese, or Japanese philosophy in terms of
(oppositionally or positively) Western philosophical ideas as much as
contributing back into English-language philosophy by bringing in
elements of Asian or African or Hawaiian philosophy« (ibid.: 20).
The history of colonialism looms large in these comparative exercises,
for:
whether it was predominantly a history of knowledge-looting, or of conver-
sion in the name of civilization or of systematic erasure of non-European
intellectual traditions by means of deletion and distortion of indigenous
cultural memories, the history of colonialism and its dream of Europeaniza-
tion of the globe, changed the global research-imperative in the Humanities.
Under and immediately after colonialism, comparison has been done, some-
what anthropologically, merely for the sake of understanding other cultures
or for the sake of finding ›fascinating‹ resemblances and disanalogies (ibid.:
28).
The insidious dilemma I described in theManifesto (2016a: 134–141)
is restated here in the following terms: »There is one extremely frus-
trating charge that should worry all of us who have dedicated con-
siderable parts of our intellectual careers to this risky business of
boundary-breaking cross-cultural thinking […] The charge, when
formulated abstractly, is this: either we represent an Asian (or African
or Islamic or Hawaiian etc.) philosophy in its own original terms,
which are utterly alien to Western philosophy, in which case it is not
philosophy proper, or we rephrase it in Western terms, in which case
it risks ending up as just a repetition of what we already have in the
West. Thus we either have no need of comparison with foreign ideas
because they are just the same or too similar to our own native ideas,
or we cannot allow it to count as hard-core philosophy because it is
too different from how philosophy is done in the Western tradition«
(2016: 18). Put in this way there is a structural parallel with the Para-
dox of Inquiry, often known as »Meno’s Paradox« but in fact dis-
cussed and refuted in detail within the Sanskrit knowledge systems:
either you already know what you are searching for, in which case the
search is pointless, or you don’t, in which case you cannot even begin.
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And as with that pseudo-paradox, the solution here is to acknowledge
states of incomplete understanding, enough to get inquiry off the
ground without forestalling it:
This space between unrecognizably and unintelligibly alien and boringly
familiar has to be found by any comparative philosopher who wishes to be
heard by the mainstreams of both of the traditions that she is trying to
bring together, either in conflict or in cooperation, in conversation or con-
testation (ibid).
A second vital document is the »Introduction« by Kris Manjapra to a
volume of essays entitled Cosmopolitan Thought Zones (2010). What
Manjapra demonstrates is that experiments in borderlessness and re:
emergence have been going on for a hundred years already, outside
the arena of orthodox comparativism. The term Manjapra uses to
denote those experiments is »aspirational cosmopolitanism«:
By speaking of &›&aspirational cosmopolitanism we mean the pursuit of
conversations across lines of difference, between disparate socio-cultural,
political and linguistic groups, that provisionally created shared public
worlds. Translation, interpretation and shared social experience created het-
erogeneous transnational public spaces […] Cosmopolitan thought zones
are the treacherous and provisional shared worlds that arise when disparate
groups seek to solve problems together (ibid.: 1).
These anticolonial cosmopolitanisms are »lateral networks« in which
a centre-periphery model is displaced by »political, intellectual and
social connections of South Asians with other colonized peoples
worldwide, and with European and American groups who stood on
the margins of imperial power, or were critical of it« (ibid.: 2).
[A concern with] medial zones of thought is not tantamount to a shift of
focus onto the intermediate spaces between two intransigent poles, Europe
and the colonies, the West and the East. Rather, the attempt is to disaggre-
gate and scale these monoliths, and to trace the plural nettings, interactions
and affinities that ranged across global dimensions […] A different frame-
work is needed in which ›the intermediate‹ does not signify the state of
being ›in between‹ two poles, but rather evokes the dynamic of being itself,
as an open process of circulation and historicity. The intermediate state of
becoming has an ontological status that need make no reference to asser-
tions about ›rooted‹ authenticity or the bounded termini of enclosed cultur-
al identities (ibid.: 7).
Here, the two myths I described in the Manifesto by which colonial-
ism seeks to ensnare the colonised is identified with perceptive clarity:
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Colonial peoples were said by British administrators to be particulars with-
out access to universals. Colonial rule insisted that the particularity and
peculiarity of Indians broached no larger ethical universalism, and had no
ultimate horizon of social meaning. The only universalism Indians could
possibly belong to was the universalism bestowed by empire. It was not
state inclusion versus state marginalization that cosmopolitans in the colo-
nies had to challenge, but the assertion about the very impossibility of their
global imagination and pursuits amounting to anything more than ›sedi-
tion‹ or ›insurgency‹. They faced an existential conundrum between inclu-
sion into the category of ›humanity‹ as mimics of the West, or relegation to
a stagnant and archaic particularity, having no access on their own to larger
significance (ibid.: 10).
The way out of this insidious dilemma is through the creation of
»universal communities transcending the imperial axis« (ibid.).
While Chakrabarti and Weber take the mind of the individual
philosopher as the site within which borderless experimentation takes
place, for Manjapra what is of interest is a transient shared public
world that is a »thought zone«. These two forms of activity, philoso-
phizing without borders and constructing medial cosmopolitan
thought zones, are perfect examples of what I have in mind when I
refer to a re:emergent philosophy.
2 The Politics of Post-Comparativism
Georgina Stewart (2016: 154–161) enriches and finesses ideas in the
Manifestowith the kind of deep insight available only to someone for
whom philosophy is not merely an academic game but a part of lived
experience. She has demonstrated the importance of language and
terminological innovation to these quests for borderlessness, re:emer-
gence, and medial cosmopolitanisms. When an adjective drawn from
one discourse is placed in apposition with a noun from another, the
linguistic effect need not be simply one of semantic restriction but
instead one of critique. So there is, in the phrase »Māori science«, »a
critical, politicized view of science, shorn of Eurocentric overtones
[…] a model for science education that combines mastery of science
knowledge with studies in critical history and philosophy of science,
exposing science’s role in the service of colonization and global capi-
tal« (ibid.: 157). Similarly, in phrases such as »Buddhist epistemol-
ogy« or »Ubuntu ethics«, there is a subtle rhetorical rejection of the
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comparativist model – a search for predefined epistemological or ethi-
cal categories in the philosophical literatures of the colonised – and
instead a challenge to rearrange and reformulate those very cate-
gories. Stewart forcefully reminds us that even as some parts of the
world rapidly progress along the path of decolonization, in other parts
the struggle is even now one of basic survival. Philosophy has been
widely hailed, in many historical epochs and many geographical loca-
tions, as a medicine for the human spirit. If it can serve as a cure,
when the disease is one of intellectual colonization and the destruc-
tion of indigeneity, then we shall also need a »preventative philoso-
phy«, to stop the disease returning, and now, as in the past, cosmopo-
litan thought zones may provide a sought-after solidarity.
If solidarity is needed anywhere it is in the region of the world
known as West Asia or the Middle East, of which the Perso-Arabian
Gulf is but one part (and »gulf« here does indeed seem to be the right
noun for adjectival critique). Solidarity is needed with those who at-
tempt with huge courage to find avenues of understanding between
Palestinian and Jew, and the three stages of comparativism continue
to serve in their important heuristic role. Here indeed, as Mustafa
Abu Sway (2016: –) rightly points out, comparative philosophy un-
derpins and facilitates inter-philosophical dialogue in a manner ana-
logous to interfaith dialogue. Solidarity is needed too, as Sway em-
phasises, with those millions of »refugees flocking to Europe across
the Mediterranean, running away from conditions that originate in
colonialism« (ibid.: 146). And solidarity is needed with the vast num-
bers of immigrant workers from South Asia, indentured by recruit-
ment fees, embezzled by false contracts, and finally enslaved by the
inhumanity of the kafala system. Solidarity is grounded in a shared
instinct for justice, and for Sari Nusseibeh the instinct for justice can-
not be separated from the instinct of love. In his marvellous experi-
ment in borderless philosophy, »To Justice with Love,« published in
the volume I mentioned above, Nusseibeh draws on Ibn Khaldun
(1332–1406) to upturn John Rawls, rehumanizing justice with the
idea of asabiyyah, the natural instinct to care for another. On the
basis of this retrieved idea he defines an Overlapping Principle, »that
there be a coincidence of the want for those things I want for others
with those things that they want for themselves« (2016: 194). This
principle »guarantees that I seek to help others to develop themselves
[…] obliging me to extend help to others«, and is, Nusseibeh argues,
more fundamental than and provides a basis for the Rawlsian Differ-
168
Jonardon Ganeri
ence Principle, which guarantees only »that I do nothing that might
prevent their ability to so develop themselves« (ibid.). In this preven-
tative philosophy, injustice is dissolved by the solidarity of love be-
fore it has chance to turn into rage.
Another adjectival construction of the same sort as those re-
ferred to by Stewart is »comparative philosophy«. My claim in the
Manifesto is that the addition of the adjective here engenders a move-
ment away from philosophy and towards a different kind of intellec-
tual activity altogether, one whose value has historically largely been
in the context of projects of intellectual decolonization. Paul Boghos-
sian rightly observes that this intellectual activity has value in cross-
cultural understanding, for »non-western cultures are of intrinsic in-
terest and one good way to interrogate and reveal their thought is to
compare what they have to say about philosophical problems with
alternative approaches to these problems«, and perhaps also in the
philosophical inquiry into fundamental problems, since non-Western
thinkers »developed important insights into some of these very same
fundamental questions« (2016: 150, 150). I am as encouraged as he is
in what genuinely seems to be a new wave of interest in the academy
in non-Western philosophies; my point is that, in addition to the two
kinds of comparative exercise he mentions, which correspond to the
second and third stages of comparativism isolated by Chakrabarti and
Weber, there is a more productive model available in terms of which
to understand the nature of this new engagement. The philosophical
academy must go global, but this will require a more profound reor-
ientation than has hitherto been realised.
3 What is a »Use of Reason«?
I appeal in the Manifesto to the notion of »a use of reason« (Ganeri
2016a: 135). Boghossian rightly presses me to clarify what I mean by
the phrase, an expression there left undefined. I will spend what space
I have left attempting to do just that. To sum up the argument I am
about to make: in Fear of Knowledge (2006) Boghossian argues that
there cannot be a plurality of genuinely distinct epistemic systems,
where an epistemic system is a set of epistemic principles, and an
epistemic principle is a general normative proposition. If my phrase
»use of reason« were taken to be a synonym of his »epistemic princi-
ple«, his argument would apply to me too. What I mean by that
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phrase, however, is something else: I mean an epistemic stance, where
a stance is not a proposition but a policy or strategy concerning the
use of epistemic principles (in Indian vocabulary, the distinction is
between the notions of pramāṇa and naya). Other names for an epis-
temic stance include »epistemic culture«, »style of enquiry«, »way of
interrogating reality«, »use of reason«, and »mode of argumenta-
tion«. My epistemic pluralism is a pluralism about stances, and so is
not the position Boghossian has argued against. In the Manifesto I
contrast the epistemic stance of colonialism with »case-based« and
»visual thinking« stances. What denies legitimacy to the epistemic
stance of colonialism is that it is dogmatic in denying the existence
of alternative stances and that it recommends the use of violence over
reason to silence alternatives.
Space for what I describe as a pluralistic realism seems to vanish in the
oscillation between two views that have largely shaped contemporary
discussion, the view, on the one hand, that that science is a single,
unified, discipline that discovers a single objective world according to
a uniquely valid set of objective epistemic procedures, and the view, to
the contrary that truth is relative to the interests, perceptions, back-
ground commitments, and values of disparate communal groups. The
most influential advocate of the second view in recent times has been
Richard Rorty, and of the first, Paul Boghossian. Boghossian meticu-
lously constructs an argument against the compatibility of epistemic
pluralism and realism. The target of his argument is the relativistic
view that »if our judgments about what it’s ›rational‹ to believe are to
have any prospect of being true, we should not claim that some belief
is justified absolutely by the available evidence, but only that it is
justified relative to the particular epistemic system that we have come
to accept« (2006: 62). Such a view would seem to »give immediate
support to the idea that there are many radically different, yet equally
valid ways of knowing the world« (ibid.). A relativist ought not say
that there are many radically different, yet equally rational, ways of
knowing the world, because »that would amount to endorsing a use of
›rational‹ that is absolute, whereas the relativist view on offer is pre-
cisely that we cannot sensibly speak of what is rational, period, but
only of what is rational relative to this or that accepted epistemic
system« (ibid.: 63, n.5). Here, the notion of an epistemic system is
that of a collection of epistemic principles, »general normative propo-
sitions which specify under which conditions a particular type of be-
170
Jonardon Ganeri
lief is justified« (ibid.: 85). There are »generation« principles, which
generate a justified belief on the basis of something that is not itself a
belief, and there are »transmission« principles, which prescribe how
to move from some justified beliefs to other justified beliefs (ibid.:
65). Again, there are »fundamental« epistemic principles, principles
»whose correctness cannot be derived from the correctness of other
epistemic principles«, and »derived« epistemic principles, whose cor-
rectness can be so derived. The way of fixing beliefs that we call
»science«, Boghossian suggests, is but a rigorous application of cer-
tain »ordinary, familiar« fundamental epistemic principles. In parti-
cular:
(Observation) For any observational proposition p, if it visually seems to S
that p and circumstantial conditions D obtain, then S is prima facie justified
in believing p.
(Deduction) If S is justified in believing p, and p fairly obviously entails q,
then S is justified in believing q.
(Induction) If S has often enough observed that an event of type A has been
followed by an event of type B, then S is justified in believing that all events
of type Awill be followed by events of type B.
And perhaps also
(Inference to the best explanation) If S justifiably believes that p, and justi-
fiably believes that the best explanation for p is q, then S is justified in
believing q.
Might there be epistemic systems other than the one for which these
»ordinary, familiar« epistemic principles provide a conception of jus-
tification? Perhaps, for example, premodern Christian societies took
as fundamental the epistemic principle Revelation:
(Revelation) For certain propositions p, including propositions about the
heavens, believing p is prima facie justified if p is the revealed word of God
as claimed by the Bible.
Likewise, the Azande, it would appear, employ a different epistemic
principle, Oracle:
(Oracle) For certain propositions p, believing p is prima facie justified if a
Poison Oracle says that p.
The three epistemic systems, modern science, Christianity, and
Azande, appear to employ divergent underived epistemic principles,
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and that might seem to motivate epistemic relativism, a view which
Boghossian defines as the conjunction of three claims (ibid.: 73):
A. There are no absolute facts about what belief a particular item of
information justifies. (Epistemic non-absolutism).
B. If a person, S’s, epistemic judgments are to have any prospect of
being true, we must not construe his utterances of the form »E
justifies belief B« as expressing the claim E justifies belief B but
rather as expressing the claim According to the epistemic system
C, that I, S, accept, information E justifies belief B. (Epistemic
relationism).
C. There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative
epistemic systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these
systems is more correct than any of the others. (Epistemic plur-
alism).
Two objections to Epistemic relationism are now countenanced. First,
propositions of the form E justifies belief B are normative, they make
claims about what one should believe given certain evidence, whereas
propositions of the form According to the epistemic system C, E jus-
tifies belief B are purely descriptive, they merely document the logi-
cal implications of a given epistemic system (ibid.: 75). A purely fac-
tual remark about what an epistemic system requires has come to
replace a normative claim. There is a second, apparently fatal, objec-
tion. According to the relativist, the absolute claim E justifies B must
be false, because justification is never absolute but only relative to an
epistemic system. The objection is that epistemic principles are gen-
eral normative statements about what beliefs are justified by what
sorts of evidence. If, therefore, particular normative statements of this
sort express something false (or incomplete), then the epistemic prin-
ciples too must be false (or incomplete):
Given that the propositions which make up epistemic systems are just very
general propositions about what absolutely justifies what, it makes no sense
to insist that we abandon making absolute particular judgments about what
justifies what while allowing us to accept absolute general judgments about
what justifies what. But that is, in effect, what the epistemic relativist is
recommending (ibid.: 87).
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Again,
If we think of epistemic systems as composed of propositions, we will have
to think of those propositions as complete, truth-evaluable propositions
which encode a particular conception of epistemic justification. And if we
do that, we will fail to make sense of epistemic relativism. We will be unable
to understand how we could coherently accept the relativist’s recommenda-
tion that we speak not of what is justified and unjustified, but only of what
is justified or unjustified relative to the epistemic systems that we happen to
accept. For we will no longer be able to make sense of our acceptance of
some of those systems over others (ibid.: 91).
The view I want to defend affirms pluralism but rejects relativism,
and I can thus agree with Boghossian on this point. Note though his
merging two separate claims under the general label »Epistemic rela-
tivism«. Boghossian’s argument against relativisation is an argument
only against what he terms »Epistemic relationism«, and does not yet
speak to Epistemic pluralism. Boghossian does present an indepen-
dent argument against pluralism, which he defines as the claim that
there are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epis-
temic systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is
more correct than any of the others. Let us suppose that one epistemic
system, C1, employs epistemic principles that imply if E, B is justi-
fied, while another epistemic system, C2, employs epistemic princi-
ples that imply it is not the case that if E, B is justified. How can it be,
in this circumstance, that there are no facts by virtue of which one
system is more correct than the other, Boghossian asks. If there are no
absolute facts about justification, then C1 makes a false claim, and C2
claims something true. More generally, if we take any contradictory
pair of epistemic systems, »if one of them is deemed to say something
false, the other will have been deemed to say something true. Under
those circumstances, it’s hard to see how it could be right to say that
there are no facts by virtue of which one epistemic system could be
more correct than any other« (ibid.). Boghossian’s target is the thesis
he terms Equal Validity: »There are many radically different, yet
›equally valid‹ ways of knowing the world, with science being just
one of them« (ibid.: 2). His argument is that the very idea of a plur-
ality of epistemic systems, each encoding a particular conception of
epistemic justification, is incoherent.
Boghossian, however, mischaracterises the view of an epistemic
pluralist. He is wrong to claim that pluralism about epistemic cultures
is reducible to a pluralism about epistemic systems, as these have been
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defined by Boghossian, namely as sets of general normative proposi-
tions which specify under which conditions a particular type of belief
is justified. Reflection on the Sanskrit knowledge systems makes this
evident. Indian epistemology in general is an analysis of pramāṇas,
methods for interrogating reality, sources of warranted belief. A pra-
māṇa is, more or less, what Boghossian means by an epistemic prin-
ciple. The Indians were perfectly aware of the distinction between
generative principles and transmission principles, and would have
chastised Boghossian for failing to mention an important transmis-
sion principle, Testimony:
(Testimony) For certain propositions p, believing p is prima facie justified if
a reliable witness testifies that p.
Their names for Observation, Deduction, Inference to the Best Expla-
nation and Testimony are pratyakṣa, anumāna, arthāpatti, and śab-
da. Yet they may have forgiven him, because they also discussed and
disagreed among themselves whether Testimony is a fundamental or
a derived epistemic principle, and they were, in general, fully cogni-
sant of the importance of establishing a basic set of underived episte-
mic principles. Other putative epistemic principles, pramāṇas, were
entertained, and much discussion took place around the question of
their status, for example, whether they are derivable from more basic
epistemic principles and whether they ought to count as epistemic
principles at all. Indian versions of Revelation and Oracle, for in-
stance, were largely dismissed. Yet, the crucially important point is
that although the different Sanskrit epistemic cultures disagreed with
each other about what the underived epistemic principles are, they
agreed that there is just one correct set of such principles. That is, they
agreed about there being just one epistemic system, even though
they disagreed about what constitutes it. Thus the epistemic plural-
ism that the Indian tradition displays cannot correctly be described as
a pluralism about epistemic systems.
In fact, the nature of the epistemic pluralism on display has al-
ready been analysed for us, and by the Sanskrit tradition itself. The
remarkable Jaina philosophers make a distinction of fundamental
epistemological significance when they say that as well as and in ad-
dition to pramāṇas, epistemic principles, there are also nayas, episte-
mic standpoints or stances, and that both are essential constituents of
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an epistemic culture.1 A naya is not a proposition but a practical atti-
tude, a strategy or policy which guides inquiry: it is an approach to
the problem of producing knowledge, not a thesis about the sources of
justification.2 One such policy might be to attend only to what is
immediately present in experience, another might be to enumerate
everything one encounters without making any categorial distinc-
tions, another to attend to stasis rather than flux, or vice versa. To
see that stances are not propositions, we need only reflect on the epis-
temic stance adopted by Nāgārjuna, the Buddhist Mādhyamika, who
denied that there is any way to say what nature is in itself (svabhāva).
Nāgārjuna was accused of refuting himself, for if his epistemic pro-
position that everything is thus empty then that proposition should
be itself empty, i. e. without meaning in itself. His response was that
he held no proposition, that emptiness is not a proposition, indeed
that it would be a fatal error to mistake adopting emptiness as a phi-
losophical position for belief in any philosophical proposition.3 And
this might remind one immediately of van Fraassen’s argument that,
as a position in the philosophy of science, empiricism is not a proposi-
tional thesis, for it if were then, since it claims that every thesis is
open to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation it would itself be
open to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation (van Fraassen
2002).4 To put it in Boghossian’s terminology, someone who claims
that Observation is the only underived epistemic principle would
have to regard Observation as itself rationally justified on the basis
of observation. van Fraassen’s response is to say that
A philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, ap-
proach, a cluster of such – possibly including some propositional attitudes
such as beliefs as well). Such a stance can of course be expressed, and may
involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot be simply equated
with having beliefs or making assertions about what there is (2002: 48).
The idea is helpfully elaborated by Anjan Chakravartty, who says
that,
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1 TS 1.6 (Tatia 1996); NAV 29.28 (Balcerowicz 2002: 124).
2 »Among these, the [general] definition is as follows: ›The reflection of one facet of
an object recognised by a pramāṇa is the standpoint,‹ because this [general definition]
pertains to all particular standpoints and because it is capable of distinguishing
[among standpoints of] different forms« (NAV 29.12; Balcerowicz 2001: 97).
3 Nāgārjuna, VV 29 (Bhattacharya et al. 1978: 113).
4 See Doctor (2014).
a stance is a strategy, or a combination of strategies, for generating factual
beliefs. A stance makes no claim about reality, at least directly. It is rather a
sort of epistemic ›policy‹ concerning which methodologies should be
adopted in the generation of factual beliefs […] Stances are not themselves
propositional; they are guidelines for ways of acting. One does not believe a
stance in the way one believes a fact. Rather one commits to a stance, or
adopts it (2004: 175).
So, for instance, »physicalism is not so much a factual thesis, but a
deference to the claims of basic science«. To adopt a stance is to re-
solve or commit oneself to acting or making decisions as described by
it. Stances are open-ended, in terms of how they are interpreted and
applied; their application requires discretion and judgement. They
express and implement values, much as the policy of not lying imple-
ments a positive valuation of the truth (Teller 2004: 166). Let me
therefore say that a stance is a policy adopted towards the employ-
ment of epistemic principles. Epistemic pluralism is a commitment to
pluralism about epistemic stances, not to epistemic systems in the
Boghossian sense.
Boghossian’s argument against pluralism about epistemic sys-
tems was that »if one of them is deemed to say something false, the
other will have been deemed to say something true. Under those cir-
cumstances, it’s hard to see how it could be right to say that there are
no facts by virtue of which one epistemic system could be more cor-
rect than any other« (2006: 91). This argument does not apply to
epistemic stances, for it is possible for there to be pairs of genuinely
alternative epistemic stances and no facts by virtue of which one is
more correct than the other. We can see this most clearly if we re-
member that stances are action-guiding policies governing the appli-
cation of epistemic principles. One can analogously think of a route as
a guide to performing the action of reaching the summit of a moun-
tain: there can be different routes up the mountain, perhaps with
different benefits and drawbacks, but equally good for reaching the
top. Here it is absurd to say that deeming one of the approaches
»true« necessitates deeming the other »false«, both because truth
and falsity are not the norms according to which plans for action are
evaluated, and because whatever that norm is, both approaches may
satisfy it equally well. To give another example: it is often the case
that a given mathematical theorem can be proved in two different
ways, adopting in each case a different proof strategy, yet both
equally »correct«, i. e. sound as proofs of the theorem in questions.
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A fundamental distinction emphasised by the Jainas – and this
was their second great theoretical achievement – is a distinction be-
tween inclusive and dogmatic ways of adopting a stance. A stance is
adopted inclusively if its adoption does not prohibit others’ use of
different stances; a stance is adopted dogmatically if its adoption does
prohibit others’ use of different stances. Someone assumes a stance
dogmatically if they believe, or expect, or even just hope, that in the
context under consideration, the stance is susceptible to rational sup-
port of the kind that makes it uniquely defensible as opposed to its
contraries (cf. Teller 2004: 162). It was, claim the Jainas, the great
failing of the traditional proponents of the Sanskrit philosophical sys-
tems that they invariably took a dogmatic approach to the epistemic
stances they articulate. The importance of the distinction is now clear:
if we restrict our attention to stances adopted dogmatically, then a
version of Boghossian’s argument against pluralism about epistemic
systems returns. For to adopt an epistemic stance dogmatically is to
deem that its prescriptions for the use of the epistemic principles is
correct and that any other prescription is faulty.
Siddharṣigaṇi, indeed, argues, in an exact parallel to Boghos-
sian’s argument against pluralism about epistemic principles, that
the dogmatist claims that whenever a piece of evidence justifies a
belief that an object has some one sort of property, e. g. stability, it
also justifies a belief that it does not have other, contrary, properties,
e. g. transformation, a claim that is literally false if reality is indeed
multi-aspectual. Epistemic stances ought not commit themselves to
the second conjunct of this claim, but should remain silent on how
things go with properties other than the one under investigation, and
to that extent they are always incomplete ways of interrogating rea-
lity. Epistemic principles, on the other hand, are complete or absolute
in their claims about justification, but they achieve completeness be-
cause there is a suppressed quantification over hidden parameters,
which can be made explicit by attaching the operator »in a certain
sense; somehow« (syāt). This is how he explains the Jaina thesis that
»this cognitive approach to a particular cognoscible may consist in
standpoints (naya) and principles (pramāṇa). Among these two, a
principle should be known to grasp completely, whereas a standpoint
should be known to grasp incompletely« (NAV 29.28; Balcerowicz
2002: 124).
Boghossian does consider a related idea, which is that epistemic
systems, as he has defined them, are sets of imperatives. He rejects
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that idea on the grounds that an epistemic system encodes a particular
conception of epistemic justification, but a set of imperatives does not,
as well as on the ground that it cannot make sense of the relativist’s
relativisation of justification to systems (2006: 91–93). But neither
argument succeeds against the view that pluralism concerns stances.
For, first, we have agreed that there is a unified epistemic system
comprised of a set of epistemic principles (pramāṇa), we have defined
an epistemic stance as a policy governing the use of that epistemic
system; thus a stance does not itself encode a conception of epistemic
justification. And second, we have separated out the claim about re-
lativisation and the claim about pluralism, which Boghossian surrep-
titiously merges in his conjunctive definition of relativism. Having
separated these distinct claims, it is evident that epistemic pluralism
about stances is compatible with a rejection of relativisation. Indeed,
if it were true that epistemic principles are imperatives then stance
pluralism would be impossible, for there cannot be distinct alternative
approaches to the dictates of an imperative.
The Jaina distinction between principles and stances is enough to
diffuse Boghossian’s argument against epistemic pluralism. I have
said that distinct stances may sometimes apply with equal correctness
to an investigation. The Jainas argue that this does not entail that the
distinct deliverances of stances are necessarily contradictory. Reject-
ing the idea that things have a single unique essence, the Jainas in-
stead say – and this is their third theoretical innovation – that reality
is in some sense manifold or multifaceted: the Jaina term is anekānta.
Metaphysics tends to treat objects, qua targets of inquiry, as if they
are simple points, like the peak of a mountain. Yet the mountain itself
is metaphysically more complex, its variously shaped sides offering
different aspects to the climber and so different potential routes to the
top. So, to quote Siddhasena, »the real thing, whose essence is multi-
plex (anekānta), [forms] the domain of all acts of awareness; an object
qualified by one facet (ekadeśa) is known as the province of the stand-
point (naya)« (NA 29.28; Balcerowicz 2002: 83). Siddharṣigaṇi elabo-
rates, adding that »the real thing, both external and internal, endowed
with a form that is under the sway of muliplex essential natures not
separate from each other, unfolds itself to all epistemic principles
(pramāṇa)« (NAV 29.1.; ibid.: 84). Mountaineers, whichever route
they select, have the same tools and techniques available to them,
but the mountain unfolds itself differently to each, and each aspect
thus presented has as much of a claim to be the essence of the moun-
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tain as any other. Likewise, each non-dogmatic epistemic stance is an
approach to some one aspect of the world. Different stances are poli-
cies for warranting beliefs about different aspects of the world. That
is, we might think that there is a plurality of special sciences, each
special science having as its provenance some particular domain or
level of properties, no such domain being reducible to any other. To
say this is to deny that there is a single way the world is in itself, that
there is some uniquely objective description of the world viewed sub
species aeternitatis, from nowhere; rather, the multiplicity of differ-
ent approaches collectively constitute a »view from everywhere«.
4 Classifying and Evaluating Epistemic Stances
An epistemic stance is a policy governing the employment of the
epistemic principles. Other names for an epistemic stance include
»epistemic culture«, »style of enquiry«, »way of interrogating rea-
lity«, »use of reason«, and »mode of argumentation«. The traditional
proponents of the Sanskrit śāstras fell into dogmatism in their atti-
tude towards the epistemic stances they articulate. Bracket the dog-
matism and what remains is a viable mode of accessing some one
aspect of reality. Each of the Sanskrit »knowledge systems« is thus
an epistemic stance (not an epistemic system, in Boghossian’s use of
that term), practiced in a distinctive way to produce knowledge in a
distinctive domain. For example,
{NyāyaMeta-epistemology} Use the epistemic principles (pramāṇa) to pro-
duce knowledge about those very principles, with a background commit-
ment to metaphysical realism and a negative hedonic soteriology.
{Alaṃkāra Poetics} Use the epistemic principles to produce knowledge about
poetry, subject to the aesthetic conventions of courtly Sanskrit.
The emptiness of Madhyamaka Buddhism is also an epistemic stance,
{Madhyamaka Emptiness} Use the epistemic principles to refute any claim
about what a thing is in itself.
The Jainas, in their survey of the variety of epistemic stances employed
in classical Sanskrit intellectual culture, identified seven distinct
stances and discussed their application. »There are [the following]
standpoints: comprehensive, collective, empirical, direct, grammatical,
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etymological, and factual«, says Umāsvāti (Tattvārtha-sūtra 1.33; Ta-
tia 1994). But Siddarṣigaṇi thinks rather that,
according to the number, however, [standpoints are] infinite, because the
real thing is endowed with infinite properties and because [various] out-
looks confined to [one] property of this [real thing] are standpoints. Never-
theless, ancient preceptors taught that there are seven standpoints, by
means of assuming seven outlooks that collect together all [possible stand-
points] (NAV 29.12; Balcerowicz 2001: 97).
Geoffrey Lloyd is sensitive to a corresponding pluralism within Eur-
opean intellectual cultures, and in his early pre-comparative work
identified in broad outlines two epistemic cultures or »modes of argu-
mentation«, which he termed polarity and analogy. The analogical
stance questions reality by appeal to resemblances, models, images
and related notions; »analogies apprehend or postulate similarities or
connections, often suggesting inferences and extensions of the simi-
larities apprehended« (2015: 3). He has shown in his later compara-
tive investigations that the analogical stance is to be found in many
Chinese writers, including those of theHuainanzi. I have argued that
this is the epistemic stance of several strands within ancient India,
most explicitly evident in the Ritual sūtras and in the Nyāya-sūtra,
and in the Manifesto I used the term »case-based use of reason« to
describe it. The analogical stance is the epistemic stance according to
which
{Paradigm} Use Induction liberally, including even from single instances
(models, exemplars), and in combination with Inference to the Best Expla-
nation.
This is not an epistemic principle derived from Induction and Infer-
ence to the Best Explanation, but a distinctive epistemic policy regard-
ing their use. By polarities Lloyd meant,
modes of reasoning that focus on pairs of opposites and use those opposi-
tions as the basis of schemas of argumentation, as when two opposites are
held to present mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives, and one
proceeds from the rejection of one to the confirmation of the other
(2015: 3).
The polarising stance, in which the epistemic principle Deduction and
in particular the law of the excluded middle are prominent, is also
evident in the work of the great Buddhist logician Dignāga, whose
»wheel of reasons« encodes just such a view about argumentation.
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Another epistemic stance, widely employed in India, appeals to visual
thinking in mathematics, the use of external visual representations,
such as diagrams, graphs, or symbol arrays, whose »epistemic roles
include contributions to evidence, proof, discovery, understanding
and grasp of concepts« (Giaquinto 2015). The same stance is operative
in hermeneutics, when compactly formulated texts are treated as put-
ting on display a certain array of concepts, rather than as presenting
explicit narrative argument (Clooney 2016). We might describe the
policy of such a stance crudely as follows:
{Visual Thinking} Use Observation, in application to diagrams, graphs, or
symbol arrays, instead of Deduction, in the construction of mathematical
proof or hermeneutical understanding.
This is the second stance I described in the Manifesto. The stance of
European scientism is dogmatic because it incorporates the belief that
science, and science alone, explains all modes of being. This is more a
creature of mythology than of fact, that the idea of science as a unified
quest for a view from nowhere is a piece of collective self-depiction
rather than a description of actual scientific practice.
{European Scientism} Use the epistemic principles in accordance with scien-
tist mythology, and do so dogmatically.
Alternative epistemic stances, such as Paradigm and Visual Thinking,
have no place within the stance of European Scientism, and are re-
garded as being incorrect. Yet they too represent modes of accessing
aspects of reality, aspects that have not been thought to fall within the
field of vision of European science, at least according to its own
mythology. These are stances that do not use the epistemic principles
with the intention of viewing the world from nowhere, for they are
contextual in application and work through the extrapolation of local
standards of comparison, drawing variably upon the individual cogni-
tive capacities of specific viewers or readers.
Dogmatism about the actual practices and modes of production
that constituted 19th and early 20th century European science, along
with a belief in the appropriateness of the use of violence to suppress
other stances, is constitutive of still another epistemic stance, which
one might term »European colonialism« or the »colonial use of rea-
son«:
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{European Colonialism} Use the epistemic principles in accordance with the
conventions of 19th/20th c. European scientific communities, and use vio-
lence against anyone who employs them differently.
The violence here is brute and physical, supplementary to the intel-
lectual violence (hiṃsā) implicit in dogmatism. While Boghossian de-
scribes relativism as implying a »fear of knowledge«, the hallmark of
this colonial stance is »fear of others’ knowledge.« Sheldon Pollock
writes that »when colonialism made the norms of Europe the norms
of India the Sanskrit intellectual formation melted like so much snow
in the light of a brilliant, pitiless sun« (2001: 24). But first, they were
not the norms of Europe, because, I have argued, there is a common
set of general normative epistemic principles that constitute a concep-
tion of justification, and indeed this was something agreed by the
Sanskrit intellectuals as much as by the Europeans. It wasn’t the epis-
temic norms of Europe that were made India’s by colonialism but its
colonial epistemic stance, the policy of imposing its own provincial
mode of accessing reality and actively undermining all others with
non-evidence-based means. That was what Simone Weil condemned
as the intrinsic absurdity of children in French Polynesia being made
to recite »Our ancestors the Gauls had blond hair and blue eyes […]«
while forbidden their indigenous custom, language and tradition, for-
bidden even access to the libraries containing documentation relating
to it. Stances are certainly open to evaluation according to non-
aletheic norms, and what rules out European Colonialism as a legit-
imate stance is that it is dogmatic in denying the existence of alter-
native stances and that it recommends the use of violence over reason
to silence alternatives.
For a World Philosophies project, the lessons to be learned are
that attention should be focused on philosophies as expressions of
stances, that there should be detailed investigation into the non-
truth-based standards of legitimacy that are appropriate to stances,
that dogmatism should be everywhere revealed for what it is, and that
all philosophies can contribute to working out what are the underived
epistemic principles.
–Jonardon Ganeri, New York University
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